A GMD can last for several days and have occurred with greater intensity prior to the development of the modern electric grid. The most significant of these storms occurred in 1921 (Railway Storm) and September 1-2, 1859 (Carrington Event). The 1921 storm was about twice as severe as the 1989 storm and the 1859 event was about three times as severe as the 1989 storm with the aurora borealis visible in Hawaii. A severe storm similar to that of 1859 has the potential to have significant impact on the electric grid and could result in the loss of large portions of the power system from reactive loads and voltage collapse, loss of shunt devices, protection system misoperation due to harmonics and power transformer heating and damage due to saturation.
Fortunately, these events produce a solar wind that can take from hours to days to reach earth. With this knowledge, grid operators can take defensive actions in addition to design practices implemented to eliminate or minimize the impact of a GMD on the power grid.
What is a Geomagnetic Disturbance?
Not all solar activity resulting in solar winds or magnetic effects reaches the earth since many CMEs and other solar phenomena produce activity that is not directed toward the earth. When a SMD occurs that impacts the earth, particularly large CMEs that involve large clouds of charged plasma with an embedded magnetic field, the earth's magnetic field is affected by the CME creating a GMD on earth.
A GMD is the earthly effect of a Solar Magnetic Disturbance or other phenomena, including a high altitude nuclear explosion known as an EMP) that results in perturbations of the earth's magnetic field. For example, a solar storm event was produced in early June of 2011 from the backside of the sun that had it been directed at earth was predicted to have resulted in significant effects on the bulk-power system. These storms are of concern due to the scale of the geographic regions affected, the potential damage to large scale power system equipment and long lead times to replace equipment, societal dependency on the delivery of electricity, and the potential for a significant GMD to occur.
How a Geomagnetic Disturbance Affects the Grid
GMDs produce a disturbance of the earth's magnetic field over very large geographic regions and can last for several days. These changes in the earth's magnetic field produces potential (voltage) differences across the various regions of the earth and are dependent on the earth's resistivity in the region. These potential differences or gradients induce currents known as geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) into the power grid particularly in areas of high resistivity.
Wye connected transformers used in the grid and other grounding apparatus are susceptible to these currents since the current flows on the path of least resistance. The highest recorded neutral current caused by a GMD is in excess of 800 amperes. In addition to the induced current, the transformers core can become saturated resulting in extreme stray flux heating. 1 According to a study by Metatech Corporation, a storm with a strength comparative to that of 1921, would leave 130 million people without power and 350 transformers damaged or destroyed. 2 While this study is considered by some as a worst case scenario, it is important to understand more about this possibility. Additional work is underway with transformer manufacturers to refine the analysis of the effects on power transformers to include more specific information related to transformer design and flux linkages.
History of Geomagnetic Disturbances & Their Effect on the Power Grid
Significant GMDs have occurred in recorded history, but few have occurred in the industrial era with modern power systems. The largest and most notable GMDs occurred on September 1-2, 1859. This event resulted in display of the Aurora or Northern Lights as far south as Hawaii and disrupted telegraph communications. Another large event occurred in May of 1921 also disrupting communications and railway control systems. More recent events including the event that occurred on March 13, 1989, demonstrate the susceptibility of the power grid to GMDs and the resulting GICs. The first recorded effects from GMDs on the electric power grid were from the solar event on March 24, 1940. Others have occurred on August 17, 1959 , August 4, 1972 , March 13, 1989 , and October 29, 2003 . The October 29, 2003 storm produced effects in South Africa where during that storm several major power transformers experienced increased gassing and some ultimately failed.
The most significant GMD events include: 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 U.S. Electric Demand Energy Information Administration Nov 13, 1989 Storm  Oct 29, 2003 Storm  This solar storm created a solar wind that reached the earth in approximately 54 hours. Essentially, the GICs and resulting voltage swings caused the shutdown of seven static Var compensators and the resulting instability caused the tripping of transmission lines and generators. The GMD resulted in damage to bulk power system transformers, thyristors, capacitor banks, and to surge arresters in the system.
Following the March 13, 1989 event a number of protective measures were taken to protect equipment from the effects of GICs. However, no comprehensive grid-wide analysis or measures have been taken to protect this critical infrastructure from a large scale GMD event that occurred in September of 1859. Recognizing that it is not a matter of if such an event will occur, but rather when such an event will occur, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to direct NERC to develop reliability standards that ensure the sustainability of the electric grid during a severe GMD event.
Joseph McClelland, Director of the Office of Electric Reliability at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, testified before a House Energy Subcommittee hearing on the issue in May of 2011, "If the solar storm of 1921, which has been termed a one-in-100year event, were to occur today, well over 300 extra-high-voltage transformers could be damaged or destroyed, thereby interrupting power to 130 million people for a period of years". 
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Quanta Technology provides a complete solution for the analysis and mitigation of Geomagnetic Disturbances and the effects of Geomagnetically Induced Currents on the power grid. The first step in any analysis and solution is understanding the impacts of the GICs on the specific system and identifying where the vulnerabilities lie. A sound GMD Management Program will include three key components; information and data gathering with system modeling and analysis; GMD monitoring programs; and GMD mitigation programs.
GMD Evaluation & Analysis
Quanta Technology has the capability to model the power system with varying geomagnetic storm levels and predict where the GICs will flow on the power grid and more importantly, where they will flow to ground through course the accuracy of any model is only as accurate as the data provided. Clients may want to collect specific modeling information related to transformer design, transformer winding resistance, grounding resistance, etc. Quanta can assist with the collection of such information and in cases where specific information is not available, recommend data values to use to model the GICs. With the data, Quanta Technology will model the GICs using either PowerWorld or PSS/E. Varying field levels and orientation will be modeled to determine the most vulnerable locations for GICs on the system under study. This information will provide insights into where GIC monitoring equipment could be installed, where mitigation measures would produce the greatest effect, and where operational measures could be considered.
In addition to understanding where the GICs flow and what equipment is vulnerable, it is equally important to consider outage scenarios, evaluate the possibility of voltage collapse, assess the impacts of harmonics on protection systems and review the impact on shunt devices. Quanta Technology, using additional tools can provide an analysis of all of these factors.
GMD & GIC Monitoring
Monitoring the information provided by NOAA through the NERC processes is important to trigger awareness of the possibility of impacts when solar storms are identified that may impact the earth. With a complete understanding of where the GICs will flow and what elements of the power system are the most vulnerable, a GIC monitoring network can be designed and installed to provide engineers and operators specific information about the level of GICs impacting the system during a GMD.
Quanta Technology can assist with the design of a GIC monitoring network and recommend monitoring equipment to be installed based on the modeling and analysis of the GICs. Alarming engineers and operators of the presence of GICs on the system will be important and Quanta Technology has the expertise to assist in the development of appropriate alarming levels, mechanisms and displays.
GMD Mitigation & Operation
Several defensive options have been considered and following the events of March 13, 1989, some of those defensive options were implemented in select portions of the bulk-power system with the greatest potential for GICs. These are areas where transmission lines are long and the conductivity of the earth is relatively high. Protecting the North American bulk-power system from a severe GMD requires a multi-layered approach involving planning, design, installation of hardware and systems, training, warning communication, implementation of defensive systems and system restoration.
NERC has suggested in their Executive Brief on the subject that the following actions need to be taken:  Protect high-value assets through hardening.  Assure there are adequate communication assets dedicated or available to electrical system operators.  Protect the use of emergency power supplies and fuel delivery, and importantly, provide for their sustained use as part of the protection of critical loads.  Separate the present interconnected systems, particularly the Eastern Interconnection, into several nonsynchronous connected sub-regions or electrical islands.  Install substantially more blackstart generation units coupled with specific transmission that can be readily isolated to balancing loads.  Improve, extend and exercise recovery capabilities.
Other recommendations include maintaining appropriate levels of spare equipment to mitigate the damage caused by a severe GMD, particularly high-voltage power transformers. Hardening the system is the first line of defense against the effects of GICs. The measures used to harden the system include:  Series capacitors in long transmission lines  Protective relay settings to detect the harmful ground harmonic currents and remove equipment from service  Microprocessor-based relays that can detect GIC , particularly harmonic components, to trip devices, engage blocking systems and implement remedial action schemes  Neutral blocking and bypassing devices including neutral capacitors and resistors with spark gap and manual bypass Possibly the lowest cost and most flexible defensive option to prevent significant damage to the bulk power system from GMDs is to identify critical transmission system equipment that is susceptible to damage and take operation actions in advance of or during the storm, including reducing loading on equipment, reconfiguring the system, and possibly isolating extremely vulnerable equipment. Recognizing the advanced warning that is provided for GMDs through NOAA, Quanta Technology can assist with design of operation procedures that can be established to limit the effects of the GMD and prevent the flow of GICs at levels that would damage equipment.
For more information regarding Quanta Technology's Geomagnetic Disturbance expertise, please contact Bryan Rushing at (919) 334-3021.
